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Abstract 
 
Although there exists a large volume of literature on the subject, a consensus on the 
labor supply effects of the social security earnings test for the elderly has yet to be 
reached. This study proposes an alternative approach of utilizing direct responses to a 
survey on the earnings test, a unique feature of our dataset compiled by the Japanese 
Government, to provide new evidence on the sensitivity of the labor supply decision of 
workers aged between 60 and 64 with respect to the earnings test. Our empirical results 
show that a large proportion of these workers are discouraged from working or reduce 
their working hours, even after correcting for observed attributes of individuals who 
reported either affected or unaffected. In addition, the revision of the test rules in 1995 
did not alter the labor supply of the elderly.   
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1. Introduction 
     Despite  the  tremendous  volume  of  published literature on the subject, it is fair to 
state that there is no consensus on the effect of the social security earnings test on the 
labor supply of elderly workers. The standard textbook theory on labor supply explains 
that the earnings test kinks the budget constraint for an individual at a threshold and 
that a change in the test rule shifts the budget constraint. Since the total effect depends 
on the relative size of income and substitution effects (Borjas (2005)), to identify the 
labor supply effect of the earnings test on a net basis, an empirical investigation is 
required. While a majority of the existing literature found a small effect,
1 recent 
studies revealed a large discouraging effect of the earnings test on labor supply 
(Friedberg (2000), Haider and Loughran (2008)), which makes empirical findings 
rather mixed. The inconclusiveness is troublesome especially for countries that 
experience a rapidly aging society and find stimulus of the elderly labor supply to be 
an urgent policy issue.   
     Japan  is  not  an  exception.  One  popular view in domestic policy debates is that 
the social security earnings test discourages paid work for the elderly through a high 
effective tax rate on income. When the sum of labor income and public pension 
                                                  
1  Burtless and Moffitt (1985) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) are earlier works that conclude 
that the elimination of the earning tests would have only minor effects on the labor supply.    4
income exceeds a certain exemption threshold, the earnings test reduces immediate 
payments of pension benefits to the beneficiaries of the Employee’s Pension Insurance 
(EPI; Kosei Nenkin) program, which covers about half the pensioners in Japan. The 
earnings test is often viewed as “punishment” on the elderly labor supply.   
     There  are  two  strands  of  studies  to examine the labor supply effects (see Gruber 
and Orszag (2003) for the literature). One is to employ a “bunch analysis” which 
examines the concentration of the earnings distribution below the threshold of the 
earnings tests. An example is Friedberg (2000) who confirmed that the bunching 
shifted in response to the revision of the earnings test in the US. The other type of 
research employs sophisticated econometric models to explore the aggregate impacts 
of the kinked budget constraint in the earnings test on the conditional hours worked by 
older workers. Again, Friedberg (2000) showed that the structural estimation yielded 
sizable impacts of removal of the earnings test on workers aged 65 and over. 
     Those  two  approaches  are  surely  effective but not perfect. One caveat of the 
bunch analysis is that it is hard to detect the labor supply effect when the response to 
the earnings test in survey data is obfuscated by measurement errors and labor market 
rigidities. Indeed, Haider and Loughran (2008) discussed this point and found a 
consistent and substantial response to the earnings test, especially for younger men, if  5
those elements are taken into account. On the other hand, structural estimations require 
a variety of assumptions of fundamental parameters which are not necessarily based on 
solid empirical research and but are likely to influence the magnitude of the labor 
supply effect.   
    These  weaknesses  in  econometric  analyses in the previous studies are partly 
responsible for the inconclusiveness regarding the effect of the social security earnings 
test on the labor supply.
2  In this study, we propose an alternative approach i.e., a direct 
response to a survey on the effect of the earnings test, unique in the literature, to detect 
the labor supply decision of the elderly subject to the earnings test. The Survey on 
Employment of the Elderly (Konenreisha Shugyo Jittai Chosa, henceforth SEE) 
compiled by the Japanese government is a large scale nationwide survey that contains 
rich information both on employment status and eligibility for social security programs. 
The SEE explicitly asks the respondents how the earnings test discouraged them from 
working. This feature enables us to identify a discouraging effect for those who quit 
working and the degree to which they circumvent a higher effective tax on labor 
                                                  
2  The number of studies on this topic is tremendous. Recent studies pertaining to the US are 
represented by Friedberg (2000), Haider and Loughran (2008), and Gruber and Orszag (2003), the 
last of which provides a very concise literature survey. Outside the US, Disney and Tanner (2002) 
examined the effect of the earnings test removal in the UK and Baker and Benjamin (1999) in 
Canada. In Japan, while a majority of studies found the significant labor supply effect of the 
earnings test including Abe (1998), Ogawa (1998) and Iwamoto (2000) found a sizable effect on 
labor supply.    6
income for incumbent workers and distill the labor supply effect of the earnings test for 
workers aged between 60 and 64.   
     The  advantages  to  examining  direct  survey responses to the earnings test are 
summarized in the three aspects by which we aim to contribute to the literature in an 
innovative way. First, this approach is exempt from misidentification when labor 
market rigidity exists. A bunch analysis implicitly assumes that a labor market is 
flexible and that workers are able to adjust their earnings and working hours. However, 
in reality, some workers may not be able to adjust their working hours to earn just 
below the threshold of the earnings test due to inflexibility in the work schedule. If this 
is the case, the earning concentration below the threshold is obscured and the 
discouraging effect is underestimated. This issue is emphasized in a recent work by 
Haider and Loughran (2008). The direct response approach enables us to identify those 
workers who want to work more hours but earn far below the threshold under earnings 
test, which is disregarded in a bunch analysis.   
     Second,  we  are  able  to  directly  measure the discouraging effect for workers who 
gave up working entirely, the people who are most seriously affected by the earnings 
test. In most cases, a bunch analysis examines wage concentration below the threshold 
of the earnings test for incumbent workers only and implicitly completely disregards  7
discouraged workers, which again understates the labor supply effect. In other words, 
our approach reveals the total effect of the earnings test on the labor supply of the 
elderly.  
     Third,  the  direct  survey  responses  enable us to distill the labor supply effect of 
the earnings test separately from the remaining factors. In most cases, it is difficult to 
identify whether lower earnings are caused by the earning test or other factors and we 
are forced to infer the effect by controlling for factors responsible for earnings using 
unobserved information, which might be insufficient to derive the effect of interest. 
The direct survey responses to the earnings test facilitate discerning the effect of the 
earnings test on labor supply.   
          While we see some notable merits in the use of direct responses to the earnings 
test, our approach is not claimed to be the best way to evaluate the effect of the 
earnings test on labor supply. Indeed, we acknowledge some disadvantages. One 
possible drawback is that the survey response is likely to be subjectively biased. 
Another possible disadvantage is that the survey responses are also likely to be 
contaminated by reporting errors. In order to address these issues, we examine whether 
the gap in the distribution of wage plus pension benefits, the object of the earnings test, 
is observed between those reporting the discouraging effect and those not reporting,  8
even after controlling for observed characteristics of individuals. We examine the 
difference in wage distributions using the methodology of DiNardo Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996), which enables us to construct a counterfactual distribution as if the 
observable attributes of both groups were homogenous.
3  Nevertheless, we propose 
that use of the direct survey responses to the earnings test complements traditional 
approaches. 
     This  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  The next section briefly describes the earnings 
rule for workers aged 60–64 in Japan and Section 3 explains the dataset used in this 
study. Section 4, the main body of the paper, presents the results of the direct survey 
responses in the 2000 survey and compares wage plus pension benefits distributions of 
those reporting and not reporting discouraging effects of the earning tests. Section 5 
also examines the effect of the change in the revision rule in 1995 and contrasts the 
results with those in the previous section. The last section concludes.   
 
2. Social security earnings test for workers aged 60–64 in Japan 
     The social security earnings test, which is called the Zaishoku Rorei Nenkin 
program, was first introduced in Japan in 1965 and has been revised every four to six 
                                                  
3  Lemiuex (2002) applied this methodology to examine the effect of change in minimum wage on 
wage distribution.    9
years. The format is different for workers aged between 60 and 64 and those aged 65 
and over. Since this study takes advantage of micro-level data from the 1996 and 2000 
SEE surveys, we will briefly describe the earnings test format for workers aged 
between 60 and 64 since the 1990s. We should remember that the earnings test rule is 
applied only to the beneficiaries of the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI: Kosei 
Nenkin) program which is applied to employees in the private sector, but not to the 
other public pension programs.
4  The object of the earnings test includes first-tier 
pension benefit for workers aged 60–64 while this is not the case for those aged 65–69.   
          In this study, we confine our interest to EPI pensioners aged 60–64, whose labor 
supply is presumably most seriously affected by the earnings test. The earnings test for 
those workers has multiple thresholds and the reduction rates differ across earnings 
brackets. In 1989, the object of the earnings test was labor income.
5  In 1995, the 
object of the earnings test became the sum of labor income and public pension benefits 
(first-tier and second-tier). At the same time, the effective rate was simplified to 20 
percent for less than 220,000 yen, 60 percent for 220,000 yen–340,000 yen and 100 
                                                  
4  National Pension Insurance (NPI: Kokumin Nenkin) for self-employed persons and the Mutual 
Aid Insurance (Kyosai Nenkin) for employees in the public sector and private schools. 
5  The effective rate for workers aged 60–64 was revised as follows: 20 percent for less than 95,000 
yen, 30 percent for 95,000 yen–114,000 yen, 40 percent for 114,000 yen–138,000 yen, 50 percent 
for 138,000 yen–165,000 yen, 60 percent for 165,000 yen–185,000 yen, 70 percent for 185,000 
yen–210,000 yen, 80 percent for 210,000 yen–230,000 yen, and 100 percent for 230,000 yen and 
over.  10
percent for 340,000 yen and over. We will examine the effect of the 1995 reform on 
elderly labor supply to complement our analysis in Section 5.
6 
 
3. Data description 
          This study uses micro-level data from the SEE compiled by the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare of the Japanese government. The SEE is performed every 
four or five years. In this study, we use micro-level data from the SEE surveys 
complied in 1996 and 2000 which contain direct responses regarding the earnings test. 
The individuals in the sample were aged between 55 and 69 and randomly chosen from 
all regions in Japan. The total sample size was 21,219 in the 1996 survey and 19,595 in 
2000. The number of workers aged 60–64 in the sample is 7,383 in 1996 and 6,692 in 
2000. To our knowledge, the SEE is only large-scale dataset compiled by the Japanese 
government and contains a selection of variables that are indispensable to examination 
of the labor supply effect of the earnings test, including the individual’s demographics 
                                                  
6  Although beyond the scope of this study, the earnings test rule for those aged 60-64 was revised 
again in 2002 and the threshold 60 percent rate increased from 340,000 yen to 370,000 yen. The 
rule was slightly revised in 2004 to include bonuses as labor income and change the reduction rate 
correspondingly, but there has been virtually no change in the rule since 2002.The earnings were 
not tested for workers aged 65 and over after the elimination of the earnings test in 1985. In 2002, 
the test revived and the workers who earned more than 370,000 yen from labor income and 
second-tier pension benefit face a marginal tax rate of 50 percent (first-tier pension benefit is not 
tested for those workers aged 65 and over). In 2007, the earnings test started to be applied to 
workers aged 70 and over. For those workers aged 65 and over, the first-tier benefit is not tested. 
See Shimizutani and Oshio (2008) for analysis for the workers aged 65 and over.  11
and employment status (age, sex, health status, type of job, monthly wage, working 
days per week, and hours worked per day, and others) as well as social security 
eligibility and benefits.
7 
          Another feature of the SEE is that it asks the respondents who are beneficiaries 
of the EPI program explicitly whether the social security earnings test discourages 
them from working. Since the survey restricts the respondents of the question to those 
who are eligible for the EPI program, there is no risk of misidentifying other 
respondents as EPI beneficiaries.
8  The 1996 survey asked the effect of the change in 
the earnings test rule, i.e., the modified earnings test, in the 1995 reform on labor 
supply, while the 2000 survey inquires regarding the effect of the current earnings test 
per se which was effective in 2000 on labor supply decision. We confine our analysis 
to the respondents of these questions and use the respondents who are eligible for 
Mutual Aid Insurance (MAI) exempt from the earnings test to complement the analysis. 
Details of the questions will be provided in later sections.   
     In  what  follows,  we  examine  the  effect of the earnings test rule on labor supply 
                                                  
7  There are other large scale data sets on employment collected by the Japanese government, 
represented by Labor Force Survey (Rodo Ryoku Chosa) or Basic Survey on Employment Structure 
(Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa) but there is no information on pension eligibility or the direct survey 
response which is indispensable to this study.   
88  Some people who are eligible for the EPI program decline their benefit when they are entitled to 
it and instead postpone. In this case, we are not able to identify the persons who are eligible using 
the information on actual receipt of the benefit. As a result, we implicitly exclude those who are 
eligible but do not currently receive any EPI benefits.  12
for workers aged 60–64 using the 2000 survey in Section 4 and then turn to examine 
the effect of the 1995 reform using the 1996 survey in Section 5.   
 
4. Direct survey response and distribution of wage and pension benefits in 2000   
     In  this  section,  we  utilize  the  respondents’ direct survey responses to the earnings 
test in the 2000 survey. This survey asked the EPI beneficiaries as follows: “Do you 
restrict working hours or days due to a reduction in or no receipt of EPI benefits under 
the social security earnings test?” Each respondent was asked to choose one of three 
answers: (1) I did not work at all because of the earnings test, (2) I restricted working 
hours or days because of the earnings test, or (3) I did not adjust employment in 
consideration of the earnings test. The number of respondents eligible for the EPI 
pension program is 3,555, of whom 2,022 answered these questions in the 2000 survey. 
Further, we confine our sample to the individuals whose wage and nonwage incomes 
are available in order to be able to compute the wage distribution.       
     Table  1  reports  the  results  on  the  labor supply response by three groups; “no 
work group” choosing answer (1), “restricted group” choosing answer (2), and “no 
effect group” choosing answer (3). In the 2000 survey, the SEE asked respondents to 
report their monthly labor income (in a 10,000 yen unit integer) earned in September,  13
just one month before the October survey was conducted.
9  It is intuitive to predict that 
wage income and labor supply is larger for the “no effect group” and smaller for the 
“no work group,” and indeed the prediction is confirmed by data. The average monthly 
wage income is the smallest at only 14,000 yen for the “no work group,” and the 
largest at 272,200 yen for the “no effect group,” while the “restricted group” is in 
between at 135,800 yen. While we see a different pattern in nonwage income (the 
average of nonwage income is 150,000–160,000 yen for the “no work group” and the 
“restricted group” while it is low at 8,400 yen for the “no effect group”), the sum of 
wage income and first- and second-tier public pension income, the object of the 
earnings test, differs substantially across the groups: 115,900 yen for the “no work 
group,” 259,500 yen for the “restricted group,” and 342,300 yen for the “no effect 
group.” This order is similarly and clearly observed in the labor supply. The average 
working hours per day is less than 0.5 hours for the “no work group” but 6.7 hours for 
the “restricted group” and 7.5 hours for the “no effect group,” implying that the 
workers in the last category work on a full-time basis. This is also the case for working 
days per week. The average working days per week are only 0.3 days for the “no work 
group” but 4.3 and 5.2 days, respectively, for the remaining groups. As a result, we see 
                                                  
9  We believe that the close proximity in time renders the information reliable.    14
a substantial difference in monthly working hours: 2.1 hours, 28.8 hours, and 39.9 
hours for the three groups. 
     These  observations  show  that  the  earnings test strongly discourages labor supply 
in a subgroup of the elderly. The sum of wage and pension income of the “no work 
group” is one third that of the “no effect group” and that for the “restricted group” is 
two thirds. This difference is also confirmed by comparing the figures of the “no effect 
group” with those of MAI beneficiaries who are exempt from the earning test. The 
table shows that the sum of wage and pension benefits is comparable between the “no 
effect group” and MAI beneficiaries, confirming that the wage and pension benefits are 
substantially smaller for the “no work group” or “restricted group.” Moreover, what we 
should notice is that the average of the sum of wage and pension income is far below 
the threshold of the earnings test. This average of the value for the “restricted group” 
or the “no work group” is beyond the lower threshold (220,000 yen).   
     However,  we  need  to  examine  not  only the average but also the distribution to 
capture the effect of the earnings test on labor supply. In what follows, we reorganize 
the three groups into two as follows: the “affected group” consisting of the “no work 
group” and “restricted group,” and the “unaffected group” which stands for the “no 
effect group.” The share of each group in the pooled sample is close to 50 percent (898  15
versus 892). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the sum of monthly wage income 
and first- and second-tier pension income. The range in the X axis is from zero to 0.8 
million yen and each cell stands for each 10,000 yen bracket.
10  If the social security 
earnings tests restrain labor supply, we would observe a bunch below the thresholds 
(220,000 yen and 340,000 yen) not for the “unaffected group” but for the “affected 
group.” Note that the first- and second-tier benefits are computed as full benefits 
without the earnings test before they were reduced, which is available in the 2000 SEE 
survey, in order to examine behavioral responses of labor supply to the earnings test.   
          We observe clearly that the whole distribution is located more to the left hand 
side (close to zero) for the “affected group,” implying that the wage plus pension 
income is lower for that group, which is consistent with the discussion on the average 
reported in Table 1. A closer look shows no bunch either below 220,000 yen (the share 
of 190,000, 200,000 and 210,000 yen is 8.7 percent in total and that of 220,000, 
230,000 and 240,000 is 9.6 percent) or below 340,000 yen (the share of 310,000, 
320,000 and 330,000 is 3.0 percent and that of 340,000, 350,000 and 360,000 is 3.23 
percent) for the “affected group.” Figure 2 depicts the reduction rate which is defined 
                                                  
10  We set the upper limit at 0.8 million yen to make the scale of the figures the same. The 
proportions of individuals whose sum of wage and pension benefits is greater than 0.8 million and 
thus who do not appear in the figures are 0.032 percent for the “affected group” and 4.37 percent 
for the “unaffected group.”    16
as the share of the amount reduced under the earnings test out of the pension benefits 
without the test. We see a striking difference between the two groups. For the “affected 
group,” the most frequent is a 20 percent reduction and, in most cases, the reduction 
rate is less than 50 percent. In contrast, more than 10 percent of the “unaffected” group 
has a reduction rate of 100 percent, followed by 50 percent reduction.   
     These  findings  provide  two  important  observations. First, figures of the workers 
who reported being undiscouraged by the earnings test indeed support their response 
that they are not concerned about the threshold of the earnings test. They earn above 
the threshold and the reduction rate is high. We do not see any bunches on the 
distribution of the sum of wage and pension income and a large portion of the eligible 
pension income is reduced. Second, the wage and pension income and working hours 
are much lower for the affected group, a very important observation relating to 
stimulus of the elderly labor supply. What is important is that the sum of wage and 
pension income does not form a bunch below the thresholds for the “affected group,” 
implying that workers who express concern about the earnings test are not able to 
adjust their wages close to the thresholds for certain reasons such as rigid working 
hours. In such a case, a bunch analysis has the pitfall of overlooking the effect of the 
earnings test.    17
     However,  it  is  too  early  to  conclude  that the social security earnings test strongly 
discourages half of the individuals aged between 60 and 64 since those people are 
inherently more likely to respond that their labor supply decision is discouraged by the 
earnings test. If this is the case, the discouraging effect of the earnings test would be 
overestimated. Thus, we need to explore whether the difference in the distribution of 
wage plus pension benefits is observed between those reporting the discouraging effect 
and those not reporting it, even after controlling for observed characteristics of 
workers.  
     Indeed,  Table  2  demonstrates  that the two groups are not homogenous in terms 
of the direct response to the earnings test and have different characteristics. The 
proportion of males is larger for the “unaffected group.” With the dominant age cohort 
at 60, the respondents’ age is younger for the “unaffected group” while it is 63 for the 
“affected group.” The “unaffected group” has a higher educational attainment as 
clearly seen in the share of university graduates and above: 9 percent versus 17 percent 
for each group. The difference is also observed in the self-report health status, which is 
worse for the “affected group.” The share of those who responded they are healthy is 
71 percent for the “affected group” and 86 percent for the “unaffected group” and that 
of those who responded they are sick is 10 percent and 2 percent, respectively. A  18
similar pattern is observed for the subjective possibility in terms of physical status to 
work: the share of those who are physically able to work is only 32 percent for the 
“affected group” but 67 percent for the “unaffected group.” One half of the individuals 
in the “affected group” responded they are able to work but that work conditions were 
a factor. Finally, we do not observe any difference in family size. 
     Thus,  we  should  explore  the  possibility that the difference in the distribution of 
wage plus pension income is still observed even if the observable characteristics were 
homogonous between the groups. Concretely, we examine the difference in wage plus 
pension income distribution using the methodology of DiNardo Fortin and Lemieux 
(1996), which enables us to construct a counterfactual distribution as if the observable 
attributes of both groups were homogenous. This is a semi-parametric approach and 
visually decomposes the change in wage distribution into two parts: the change in the 
distribution of the attributes and the change in the effect of attributes on distribution of 
wage and pension income.     
     Concretely,  the  decomposition  approach  is  described  as  follows.  Denoting  i as a 
group, the distributions of wage and pension income for the “affected group” and the 
“unaffected group” are written as   
  19
, ) | ( ) | ( ) (    dX affected i X h X Y f Y f
affected affected   
   , ) _ | ( ) | ( ) (
_ _ dX affected not i X h X Y f Y f
affected not affected not  
 
respectively, where  ) | ( X Y f
affected   is the mechanism to determine the wage and 
pension income of the “affected group” that maps workers’ characteristics X to the 
wage distribution Y and ) | (
_ X Y f
affacted not   is that of the “unaffected group.” Moreover, 
what the distribution of the sum of wage and pension income would be if the 
distribution of X of the “affected group” is that of the “unaffected group” is written as   
 
. ) | ( ) | ( ) (
_ _    dX affected i X h X Y f Y f
affected not affected not
affected  
 
The DiNardo Fortin and Lemieux approach employs a “re-weighting” method to 
estimate the counterfactual distribution. The counterfactual distribution can be 
rewritten as: 
 
   dX affected i X h X Y f Y f
affected non affected non
affected ) | ( ) | ( ) (
_ _  
, ) _ | ( ) | (
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  20
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    where the conditional 
probabilities,  ) | ( X affected i P   and  ) | _ ( X affected non i P  are propensity 
scores for the specific observations for those who are affected and those who are 
unaffected, respectively, conditioned on X, which are calculated by the logit model in 
this analysis. The terms ) ( affected i P   and  ) _ ( affected non i P  are calculated based 
on the proportion of the observations for each group. The counterfactual distribution is 
computed by the kernel density estimation, using calculated weight . The kernel 
density is also useful to adjust for reporting errors in this study. To make the results 
comparable with those from the histogram analysis, we take the level of wage and 
pension income as the dependent variable but the results are unchanged when we take 
the logarithm of the sum as the dependent variable. 
     In  the  analysis,  we  compare  the  actual distribution for the “affected group” with 
the counterfactual distribution which is defined as what the density of wage would 
have been if the attributes of workers of the “unaffected group” were those of the 
“affected group.” If the difference in the observable attributes between the two groups 
produces a difference in the distributions, the counterfactual distribution will overlap 
with the distribution of the “affected group.” If this is not the case, however, and the  21
counterfactual distribution still remains to the right of that of the “affected group,” the 
discouraging effect of the earnings test between the two groups would not be explained 
by the difference in the characteristics of the two groups, which is observable.   
     Figure  3  reports  the  actual  distributions of the two groups and the counterfactual 
distribution. When comparing the actual distributions in the two groups, we see that the 
“peak” in the distribution of the affected group is located to the left of that of the 
unaffected group, which conforms to the histogram analysis in Figure 1. What is 
interesting is the comparison between the actual distribution of the affected group and 
the counterfactual distribution, both of which are based on the same observable 
attributes of the affected group. We still see that the distribution of the counterfactual 
distribution is located to right of that of the “affected group.” This finding shows that, 
even after correcting the selection in the observable attributes between the two groups, 
the sum of wage and pension income is smaller for the affected group and the earnings 
test discourages a subgroup of the individuals in the sample from working more. From 
a closer look, we observe that the peak of the affected group is located near 220,000 
yen, the lower threshold of the earnings test. Moreover, the cumulative density is larger 
for the unaffected group above 340,000 yen, the upper threshold. These observations 
reinforce the finding on the discouraging effect of the earnings test on labor supply for  22
the individuals reporting that they were discouraged by the test.   
     In the analysis mentioned above, we included the “no work” group in the sample. 
In order to explore the possibility that the finding is altered by those who do not work 
at all, we exclude those workers and perform the same decomposition analysis for the 
“restricted group” and the “unaffected group.” Figure 4 describes the actual 
distributions of the sum of wage and pension income of those two groups and the 
counterfactual distribution as if the observed attributes of the individuals in the 
“unaffected group” were the same as those of the “restricted group.” In the figures, we 
see that the counterfactual distribution overlaps that of the unaffected group. This 
implies that the difference in the distributions of the two groups does not come from 
the difference in the characteristics of the individuals in the sample. In other words, 
even if the observable characteristics are homogenous between the two groups, the 
distribution of the unaffected group is unchanged and the gap between the two groups 
remains.  
     Together  with  the  findings  in  Figure  3, we confirm that the discouraging effect 
of the earnings test is clearly observed for the affected group and the difference in the 
distribution of the affected and unaffected groups does not stem from different 
characteristics of the individuals in each group. These observations show that, even in  23
the case that we do not find a bunch below a threshold of the earnings test, we still find 
a large discouraging effect of the earnings test, which has been largely ignored by the 
previous work on the topic.   
 
5. Direct survey response to the 1995 reform in the 1996 survey   
     In  this  section,  we  take  advantage of the direct response to the 1995 reform 
addressed in the 1996 survey in order to complement the findings in the 2000 survey. 
Some aspects of the earnings test for those aged 60 and 64 were revised in 1995. First, 
the object of the test became the sum of labor income and first-tier and second-tier 
pension benefits, not just the amount of labor income. Second, more importantly, the 
reduction rate (only three rates after the reform) and the thresholds (two after the 
reform) were greatly simplified to erase the ranges of the income bracket for which, 
after reduction of the pension income, the net income decreased. Before the reform, if 
a worker earned more, his net income declined since the effective reduction rate of the 
earnings test was high. 
          The 1996 survey asked “Did the reform in 1995 affect your employment status?” 
Each respondent was asked to choose one of four answers: (1) yes, I began to work, (2) 
yes, I now earn more than before, (3) yes, I moved to a firm which provides a higher  24
wage, (4) no, the reform did not affect my employment at all. The difference between 
the 1996 survey and the 2000 survey is that the 1996 survey asked the respondents 
about their response to the change in the earnings test rule while the 2000 survey asked 
about their response to the incumbent earnings test rule per se. Since the question was 
asked only of respondents who actually received a reduced amount of public pension 
income under the earnings test, the number of the respondents who answered was 262 
in 1996.   
     In  what  follows,  we  organize  two groups: the “positively affected group” 
consisting of the respondents who chose (1), (2), or (3) and the “no effect group” for 
those who chose (4). Table 3 reports the summary statistics. First, we observe that the 
share of those who were encouraged to work more due to the 1995 reform is small at 
13 percent while the remaining did not alter their labor supply. Second, in terms of 
wage income, nonwage income, and pension benefits, the individuals in each group are 
comparable. Third, the proportions of males and the younger age bracket are larger for 
the positively affected group, implying those workers are more willing to work more. 
Fourth, we do not see a large difference in health status but the share of those who 
self-report their physical status as able to work on a full-time basis is larger for the 
positively affected group.      25
     These  observations  show  that  the  1995 reform stimulated the labor supply of a 
small proportion of the workers who are male, younger (in their 60s), and physically 
able to work on a full-time basis, but the effect is limited. One possible explanation is 
that workers are not able to adjust their labor supply freely. If they were able to do so, 
we would see a bunch below a threshold of the earnings test. However, we found that 
this is not the case in reality, implying that small changes of the test rule do not alter 
labor supply behavior. Together with our findings using the 2000 survey, the findings 
of the 1996 survey indicate that the discouraging effect of the social security earnings 
test is large and that partial reform had only a limited effect.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
     The  large  volume  of  literature  has  not reached a consensus on the labor supply 
effect of the social security earnings test for the elderly. We propose an alternative 
approach of utilizing direct responses to a survey on the earnings test, which is unique 
in our dataset compiled by the Japanese Government, and provide new evidence on the 
sensitivity of the labor supply decision of workers aged between 60 and 64 with 
respect to the earnings test. We take advantage of micro-level data from the nationwide 
survey on employment of the elderly to examine the change in the labor supply effect  26
for those aged 60–64 in the 1996 and 2000 surveys.   
     Our  analysis  provides  several  important findings. First, half of those workers are 
discouraged from working or reduce their working hours. This is also the case even 
after correcting for the observable attributes among individuals who reported affected 
and unaffected. Second, the revision of the test rules in 1995 did not alter the labor 
supply of the elderly.   
     Our  empirical  findings  show  that  the  labor supply effect of the social security 
earnings test may have been underestimated because of measurement errors or labor 
market rigidities. In this study, we argue that a direct response to the question on the 
labor supply effect is an alternative to complement the traditional methodology to 
examine the labor supply effect of the earnings test. Further study should examine the 
effect of the social security earnings test considering other important factors 
influencing the labor supply decision such as health status, family relationships, and 
labor-leisure choices as well as the retirement decision of the elderly.    27
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Wage income 1.14 13.58 27.22 11.82
  (ten thousand yen) (5.83) (12.73) (26.79) (19.33)
Nonwage income 14.50 15.72 8.37 20.71
 (ten thousand yen) (10.91) (9.62) (10.476) (6.85)
Wage + pension income 11.59 25.95 34.23 31.75
 (ten thousand yen) (9.48) (14.94) (26.40) (19.23)
Working hours per day 0.45 6.65 7.53 3.87
(1.80) (2.07) (2.09) (3.76)
Working days per week 0.30 4.29 5.17 2.58
(1.21) (1.39) (1.24) (2.53)
Monthly working hours 2.14 28.790 39.86 18.40
(9.20) (14.03) (15.46) (20.23)
Number of observations 576 322 892 321
Note: Figures in parentheses are the standard deviation.
No work group Restricted group No effect group MAI beneficiaries
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  Table 2 Summary statistics in the 2000 survey
mean S.D. mean S.D.
The affected* 1 0 0 0
Wage income 5.602 10.745 27.217 26.787
Nonwage income 14.939 10.477 8.365 10.476
Current EPI benefits 10.057 8.598 3.070 5.854
Current earnings-tested EPI benefits  0.728 2.890 1.734 3.688
Full benefits without the earnings test 1.079 4.302 3.942 7.439
Male * 0.609 0.488 0.723 0.448
Age 60 (dummy variable)* 0.187 0.390 0.221 0.415
Age 61 (dummy variable)* 0.185 0.388 0.192 0.394
Age 62 (dummy variable)* 0.212 0.409 0.203 0.402
Age 63 (dummy variable)* 0.232 0.422 0.215 0.411
Age 64 (dummy variable)* 0.185 0.388 0.169 0.375
Educational attainment (junior high school 0.411 0.492 0.352 0.478
  Educational attainment (senior high
school or two-year college)*
0.497 0.500 0.474 0.500
Educational attainment (university)* 0.089 0.285 0.170 0.376
Health status (healthy)* 0.709 0.454 0.855 0.352
Health status (not healthy)* 0.188 0.391 0.121 0.326
Health status (sick)* 0.102 0.303 0.024 0.152
Physical status (possible to work on a
full-time basis)
0.315 0.465 0.674 0.469
Physical status (possible to work
depending on work conditions)
0.513 0.500 0.320 0.467
Physical status (impossible to work) 0.171 0.377 0.007 0.082
Family size 2.843 1.382 2.889 1.433
Number of observations
Note: * refers to a dummy variable. The summary statistics for each prefecture dummy
              (47 dummies) are omitted.
Those affected by the
earnings test




Table 3 Summary statistics in the 1996 survey
mean S.D. mean S.D.
T h e  a f f e c t e d * 1000
Wage income 18.882 8.146 18.838 15.348
Nonwage income 11.000 6.831 9.618 7.565
Current earnings-tested EPI benefits  8.559 5.304 7.544 5.371
Full benefits without the earnings test 14.629 7.693 13.953 9.919
Male * 0.941 0.239 0.724 0.448
Age 60 (dummy variable)* 0.265 0.448 0.171 0.377
Age 61 (dummy variable)* 0.353 0.485 0.215 0.412
Age 62 (dummy variable)* 0.176 0.387 0.215 0.412
Age 63 (dummy variable)* 0.088 0.288 0.202 0.402
Age 64 (dummy variable)* 0.118 0.327 0.197 0.399
Health status (healthy)* 0.853 0.359 0.842 0.365
Health status (not healthy)* 0.147 0.359 0.145 0.353
Health status (sick)* 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.114
Physical status (possible to work on a
full-time basis)
0.765 0.431 0.561 0.497
Physical status (possible to work
depending on work conditions)
0.235 0.431 0.430 0.496
Physical status (impossible to work) 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.093
Family size 2.735 1.463 3.181 1.604
Number of observations
Note: * refers to a dummy variable. The summary statistics for each prefecture dummy







Figure 1 Distribution of wage plus pension benefits
(A) Those who are affected by the earnings test
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Figure 2 Distribution of reduction rates by the earnings test
(A) Those who are affected by the earnings test
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Figure 4 Decomposition analysis of wage and pension benefits 
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